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During, and most especially after the death of the Buddha,
there existed much confusion and speculation regarding Buddhist
doctrines of rebirth.

The theoretical and philosophical aspects

of the concepts of rebirth were among the concerns of these
Buddhists.

How could one be reborn if one

~id

not have a self?

How did one's karma affect the circumstances of one's rebirth?
On another level, there was much debate over the mechanics of
rebirth.

How does one's karma trigger rebirth if there is no

transmigration?

Is there an intermediate state of being between

death and life, and if so, what form did this state take?
Some schools did not approach the philosophical problems of
rebirth.

Taking the teachings of karma and rebirth as true based

on accounts of extra-sensory verification by Gautama Buddha and
others (Hick 349), these chose to concentrate on the practical
aspects of practice in the here-and-now rather than to tie up
valuable time and energy in intellectual nit-picking.
Still other schools banked on rebirth, so to speak, finding
in it the key to eventual liberation.
In an attempt to display the range of concerns and interests
regarding rebirth, I plan to make a brief and sampled survey of a
few select schools and sects of Buddhism.

More emphasis will be

placed on Indian Buddhism as it was here that much of the debates
raged and were settled for the descendent forms of Buddhism in
other parts of the globe, namely China and Japan.

Special

consideration will be given, however, to Tibetan and Pure Land
schools as their understandings of or interest in rebirth vary

significantly from that of traditional Indic-Buddhist views.
While contemporary scholars, particularly those in the West, have
begun to tackle the karma and rebirth debates once again, adding
to the fray scientific reasoning, I will not be addressing their
efforts here.

THE INDIC DEBATES
No-Sel:C a:nd Rebi:r"Ul

It is important to the study of rebirth that frequently it
is asked, What it is that is reborn if not the Self (atman)?

And

since there is no Self, but only bundled aggregates, one wonders
if it is the aggregates that are reborn and then to what extent
those aggregates which continue to arise in a separate life
constitute the same personal entity which existed in the former
life.

(The precise relation between the aggregates and the

personal entity was thoroughly explored by the later Indic
Madyamaka school, the theories of which are detailed later in
this paper.)
First, let us look at the earlier Indic schools which
determined that death and rebirth as we generally know it were
not really different than momentary death and rebirth.
There are many students of Buddhist thought who have few
problems accepting intellectually the Buddhist doctrine of
Patitya-Samutpada, co-conditioned origination, which involves the
concept of momentary birth and death, and the interconnected
simultaneous arising of the five skandhas.

A greater

intellectual leap-of-faith, so to speak, is required in extending

this understanding to the link between one's death and subsequent
rebirth.
Looking more closely, in a given ordinary moment of our
life, our present actions give rise to, that is condition, the
following moment.

The actions performed during this instant of

existence bear their fruits in the context of a complex and
intertwining set of karmic activity originating not only with the
individual her or himself, but with the entire environment s/he
interacts with.

Because of this, any given act's consequences

will be shaped by this tremendous interconnectedness of other
actions and their consequences.
existence is thus maintained.

A certain sense of homogeny of
Most actions one performs will not

drastically alter the general conditions of existence and thus
contiguity and continuity is easily perceived, and usually
expected.

(The problem lies with the fact that this very

continuity is mistaken as a Self or atman.)
Just as the differing individual frames of a motion picture
appear to follow, or even flow, one into another and make sense,
each individual instant of existence appears to follow or flow
one into another.

The conditions of one moment in our everyday

lives are so similar to the conditions of the next that the
casual causal relationship is evident.

This momentary death and

rebirth is easily validated.
Specifically, the individual personal entity which dies and
is reborn every moment is made up more or less of it's five
intimately intertwined skandhas in interaction with the
surrounding environment.

At the point of biological death, this

association dissolves.

Poussin defines death in the Buddhist

perspective as
the dissociation of the organism constituted at birth
to experience the fruits of a certain set of actions .
. death marks the end of this homogeneous renewing
[of momentary existence]: it is the separation of the
constituent elements of the pseudo-individual, the
dissociation of the elements (skandha) , i.e. of the
gross elements (mahabhuta, rupakaya) and of the
vijnana, or intellect. (Poussin 447)
With biological death the physical form, one's body, ceases
to function in a manner which will support the arising of all of
the other constituent parts.

Let's study this in more detail.

The first skandha, Matter, makes up our physical form.

The

second skandha, Sensations, which are "experienced through the
contact of physical and mental organs with the external world"
(Rahula 20), is dependent upon the first, as the physical and
mental organs are made of matter.

The third skandha,

Perceptions, which "recognize objects whether physical or mental"
and "are produced through the contact of our six faculties with
the external world" (Rahula 21), dependents upon the second (and
therefor the first) as sensations must exist to be perceived.
The fourth skandha, Mental Formations, "include all volitional
activities" (Rahula 22).

As volitional activities arise due to

attachments to objects, and attachments can only occur where
objects are perceived, Mental Formations are dependant upon the
third skandha (and thus on the first and second).

The Fifth

skandha, Consciousness, is simply awareness.
The Buddha declared in unequivocal terms that
consciousness depends on matter, sensation, perception
and mental formations, and that it cannot exist

independently of them"

(Rahula 25).

So, as the body dies, sensory organs cease to function,
perceptions come to an end, and mental formations.based on
perceptions discontinue to arise.

This leaves consciousness to

condition rebirth.
But the connection between this death consciousness and the
birth consciousness is much more difficult to comprehend than
that between momentary death and rebirth.

This is because the

moment of death conditions a following state of existence that is
dramatically different than that of the

"ordinary" day-to-day

existence one knows to be her or his life.

Going back to the

analogy of the motion picture, the casual causal relationship
between theses two moments would be as difficult to comprehend as
story line of a Humphrey Bogart movie to which a Whoopi Goldberg
movie had been spliced.

Both continuity and contiguity are not

as readily apparent.

Of much dispute between the various schools of Indian
Buddhism was the issue of an intermediate-state between the
moment of death and the moment of rebirth (McDermott 170).

Let

us first take a very brief look at a few of those schools which
believed in an intermediate state of existence.
According to Bareau, the Saravastivadins, Sammatiyas, and
Purvasailas believed firmly in an intermediate existence that
linked death and rebirth (449).

In addition, the Vatsiputriyas

also held a belief in an intermediate existence between death and
rebirth, but their conception of this existence varied greatly
from the others, as we shall see.

The Theravadins and

Mahasamghikas, on the other hand, firmly denied all forms of
intermediate existence (Bareau 449).
Representative of a number of schools believing in
intermediate existence is the Sarvastivadins.

Vasubandhu, in his

Sarvastivadin years, argued that between the moment of death and
the moment of rebirth, each of which are made up the five
aggregates, is the karmically determined antara bhava, also made
up of the five skandhas.

This is said to arise in the place of

death and carry the "configuration of the future being"
(McDermott 171-172).
Vasubandhu at that point held that rebirth takes place in
the following manner:

The fairly substantial and conscious

antara bhava, possessing both a "divine eye" and a "fully
developed set of sexual organs" sees its parents joined in
intercourse and becomes aroused by the scene.
desirous of one of the parents (the father,

It becomes

if female and the

mother, if male) and jealous of the other parent.

Thus, out of

this desire and hatred, it becomes attached in the womb, where it
conditions the first moment of "birth existence" (pratisamdhi)
(McDermott 170-172).
The early school of the Vatsiputriyas, or Pudgalavadins
(McDermott 168), which developed from the Sthavira school,
also believed in an intermediate state of being.

However, while

the intermediate being explained by Vasubandhu consisted solely

of a bundle of five aggregates, the Vatsiputriyas' intermediate
being did not.

They believed, rather,

in the existence of a "person" (pudgala) who is neither
identical to the five aggregates (skandhas) that make
up the living being nor different from them; [and
existing] neither within these five aggregates nor
outside them.
. [T]his "person" lives on from one
existence to the next, thus ensuring the continuing
identities of the agent of an act and.of the being who
suffers its effects in this life or the next. (Bareau
448)
In other words, the pudgala does not undergo change.
does not die to be reborn in each conscious moment.

It

Yet,

ineffably, it is neither true that it remains the same from one
instant to the next (McDermott 169).

This view was unique among

the early Buddhist schools, and the hypothesis of the pudgala was
rejected by all other sects as being a "disguised" concept of

atman, though the Vatsiputriyas maintained that it was not
(Bareau 448).
The Theravadin school, which still survives to this day,
denied the possibility of an intermediate state, and explained
the process of rebirth in terms of "rebirth-linking (patisandhi)
of the present state with the immediately preceding
of becoming (McDermott 169)."

. state

The Theravadin figure Buddhaghosa

posited that in the normal experience of death the sense
faculties fail one by one, leaving only the consciousness
supported only by "the heart-basis".

The very last instant of

consciousness before death (the cuti vinnana) karmically
conditions the very first instant of consciousness, the

(patisandhi vinnana) which occurs at the time of conception.
Thus, nothing is carried over.

Rather the relationship

between the cuti vinnana and the patisandhi vinnana is analogous
to the relationship between a seal and wax:

the seal and the

impression it leaves in the wax are obviously not the same
entity, but the impression is very much caused, or conditioned by
the seal.

This results in the impression, which takes on the

same shape, or qualities, of the seal.
the karma itself, transmigrates.

Thus nothing, including

Instead,

What was reborn was not an entity, but an evolving
consciousness, whose quality had been conditioned by
karma.
Furthermore,
karma was understood to be more
than just acts and deeds in anyone life.
It was above
all the volition that stood behind those deeds.
(Mathews 125)

Determinism, Retribution, Karma, and -the Middle Way

It is because of this volitional element that the theories
of karmic retribution found in some texts puzzle some scholars.
The natural or physical elements of one's environment usually
cannot be traced to volitional actions.

A rock warming up as

sunlight hits it may be a karmic process, but there is no
volition involved.

While social and economic conditions arise

from people's volitional actions, and although an individual is
linked somewhat to that arising due to their participation in the
various social and economic institutions (the Chinese Hua-Yen
School was particularly aware of this), the link is not a direct
one.

Karma provided tendencies or conditions rather than
consequences as such. • • • If anything could be said
to be predetermined, it was the physical environment
that can give rise, or not give rise, to opportunity.
Canonical Buddhism recognized apart from karma, other

forces that affect causality. These included
biological laws, accident and attack.
It would be
incorrect to assume that dukkha or sukha (pleasure)
were the product only of one's karma or actions.
(Mathews 125-6)
.
To illustrate, in the Cakkavattisihanada Sutta, "unstable
social and economic conditions are said to be conducive to crime"
(Mathews 139).

To say that a person who is the victim of a crime

is suffering retribution for a crime that slhe committed in the
past would be incorrect, as the cause of the crime is more linked
to the criminal's past conduct, and to the greater social and
economic conditions at large, than it is to the victim's past
actions.

Although it can be argued that the victim helped

somewhat to condition the occurrence of the crime by
participating in the social and economic processes, that this
participation would be enough for retribution of this scale to
occur, it would follow that all would be the victims of such
crime.
The other problem of belief in retribution is that it leans
towards a deterministic understanding of the karmic process.

It

is certain that the Buddha's teachings did not support
deterministic views.

Given these arguments, it can be assumed

that when the Buddha spoke of karmic retribution, he may have
been addressing audiences for which such a lesson would have been
most useful (upaya).
So how then is this related to rebirth?

How is it that past

actions affect the present moment and future moments, especially
those occurring in the next life, in a way that is not

deterministic?

How is karma not-yet-expended "carried" into the

next life?
In the Theravadin Abhidamma, karma was seen as "a continuum,
a process interpenetrating and spanning past, present, and future
occasions" (Mathews 127).

Here karma is existent not as a

substance but as a potential.

While a past act no longer exists

as such, its potential is present in the moment at hand.

For

example, "each inspired thought process renders service to the
next mental state, passing on the totality of its energy"
(Mathews 127).
It is because of this that the last thought is so integral
to the process of rebirth.

Or perhaps more accurately, as

Mathews has pointed out, it is not necessarily the last thought,
or death-consciousness, but rather the thought preceding and thus
conditioning it is the most important (Mathews 130).

In a person

dying in a timely and natural manner is said to experience a
"terminal" thought consciousness,
which is affected by one of three thought objects:
recent karma (either as volition and deed just
performed, or as something that has been habitual); a
symbolic memory of one great act, good or bad (kamma
nimitta); or by some indication or anticipation of the
place of rebirth (gati-nimatta).
[It is] this
experience [which] is registered by the final death
consciousness (cuti-citta).
(Mathews 129)
It is this that has the power to enter into the
appropriate matrix as rebirth consciousness
(patisandhi-vinnana) , carrying with it all the surplus
karma of the previous existence.
(Mathews 130)
The Yogacara school presented a slightly different answer to
this issue by developing the concept of the Storehouse

consciousness (Alaya-Vijnana).

This is one of the six types of

consciousness making up the aggregate (skandha) of consciousness
(vijnana).

It is roughly similar to the Western notion of the

subconscious in that it has influence on one's actions but is
unknowable by ordinary humans.

This consciousness serves as a

receptacle of karmic "seeds" (bijas), or energies generated by
one's actions.

According to Weinstein,

Like the other types of consciousness, the alaya is
impermanent, reproducing itself, as do the seeds that
comprise it, from one moment to the next.
It differs
from the other six types of consciousness, which are
readily discernible, in that it is fully cognizable
only to Buddhas.
.(177)
The precise functioning and nature of the alaya was debated
heavily among ¥ogacara scholars in the 6th and 7th centuries
C.E., the most influential of which was Dharmapala (530-561
C.E.), as it was his interpretation which was transmitted to
China where it was adopted and further developed by Chi, or
K'uei-chi, "into the doctrinal system subsequently called Fa
hsiang (Jpn., Hosso)" (Weinstein 178).
This doctrinal system divided the aggregate of vijnana
into eight types rather than six.

Fa-hsiang counted the alaya as

the eighth of these, and held that it
receives the effects of all good and evil acts, whether
physical, verbal, or mental, and stores them as
"seeds."
When the appropriate conditions are in place,
these seeds, as the word implies, produce their own
effects, which are manifested as the unique
psychological and physical makeup of each being. The
realm and conditions of rebirth are likewise determined
by the mixture of seeds stored in the -vijnana.
(Weinstein 178)

The seventh consciousness, of which ordinary beings are also
unaware, "is that part of the mind that is turned inward,
mistaking the for a real self (atman) , to which image it
tenaciously clings".

This consciousness, called mo-na-shih,

fails to understand that "it essentially has no existence apart
from the seeds (effects of acts) that it holds".

This

misunderstanding leads to the wrong belief that all beings have
selves (atman) , which is the precise misconception at the root
off all suffering (Weinstein 178).

With all of the talk of mistaken idea of Self, and of the
Consciousness as being the link between successive lives, one
must come back to the question of what constitutes the individual
entity which experiences these successive lives.
The Madyamaka thinkers, among others, took up the debate on
the relationship between the aggregates and the self (personal
entity) in great length.

Chandrakirti, in the sixth chapter of

his Guide to the Middle Way, asserts that,
The self is neither essentially
aggregates nor of the nature of
not the basis of the aggregates
possess them.
Rather, the self
dependence upon the aggregates.

other than the
the aggregates.
It is
nor does it inherently
is established in
(Koller 289)

This dependence upon the aggregates is not meant to imply
that the self is completely other than the aggregates.

But it

would be just as incorrect to assert that the self was the same
as the aggregates, or even the collection of aggregates.

The

Madyamaka School, also called the "Middle-Way School", sought to
understand the self, or personal entity as lying between these
extremes.
Echoing the dialogue between King Milinda and Nagasena

(Milindapanha, 25) in which Nagasena explains the concept of
Anatman with the analogy of the chariot, Chandrakirti writes:
Rather the self is established in dependence upon
the aggregates.
In this respect it is similar to a
cart, for a cart is not asserted either (1) to be
essentially other than its parts, or (2) to be
identical with them, or (3) inherently to possess them
or (4) to be inherently dependent upon them, or (5) to
be the basis upon which they inherently dependant, or
(6) to be the mere collection of them, or (7) to be
their shape. (Koller 289)
As the personal entity is partitive, there is no way to
identify it solely with any of its parts; nor is it really
possible to identify it with even the collection of the parts.
If the mere collection of the parts were the cart,
the collection of the same parts placed in a heap
should also be the cart. (Koller 289)
However, in the Madyamakakarikas, Nagarjuna says:
Of all these actions, whether dissimilar or similar,
belonging to certain realms, only one would arise at
the moment of birth [of a being]. (17.17)
Kalupahana analyzed this passage as so:
Here, karma is presented as the connecting link between
two lives.
It is one of a myriad of karmas an
individual may have performed, whether they be similar
or dissimilar. The fact that only one among such
actions of a life-time may appear at the time of the
conception of a being and which can influence the new
life-process is acknowledged by Nagarjuna.
He could
not have been unaware of the statement of the Buddha
that consciousness (vijnana which is inextricably bound
up with volitional karma) was a possible connecting
link between two lives (Digha-Nikaya 3.105) and also of

the emphasis placed by his fellow Buddhists on the last
thought of the dying person (cutti-citta) as having
influence over a new life process. (Kalupahana,
Nagarjuna 252)
Nagarjuna was clear that though the consciousness may be the
link between two lives,

vijnana is not itself to be mistaken as a

Self, nor is it to be assumed that the personal entity remains
the same during successive lives:
The view that I existed in the past is not appropriate,
for whosoever was in the previous birth, he, indeed, is
not identical with his person. (27.3)
(Kalupahana,
Nagarjuna 378)
Tibetan Schools and 'the Tibetan Book of the Dead

The Tibetans made a thorough study of the process of death
and rebirth.

Unlike the even the Indic schools which did believe

in an intermediate state of being, the Tibetans held that the
intermediate state is quite long and elaborate.

Like the Indic

schools, they believed the last moment of life to be far more
important than the intermediate state.

The last moment is of

utmost importance simply because it, more than any other moment
of existence during one's lifetime, conditions the state of
rebirth.

Let us read again Poussin's definition of death from

the Buddhist perspective.
the dissociation of the organism constituted at birth
to experience the fruits of a certain set of actions.
• death marks the end of this homogeneous renewing
[of momentary existence]: it is the separation of the
constituent elements of the pseudo-individual, the
dissociation of the elements (skandha) , i.e. of the
gross elements (mahabhuta, rupakaya) and of the
vijnana, or intellect. (Poussin 447)

Because of this dissociation, any act performed at the
instant of death will bear its fruit in a context where far fewer
"outside"

karmic constraints wiil condition the outcome.

Thus a

thought of wishing for a drink of water arising in everyday life
will rarely have dire consequences as many factors will temper
them.

A thought of wishing for a drink of

~ater

at the instant

of death may have the result of having conditioned one's rebirth
into a hell.
In response to the great importance of the last instant of
life in the conditioning the state of rebirth, Tibetan Buddhists
developed the Bardo Thodol.
According to Evans-Wentz, this text was thought to have been
handed down orally for many generations before being committed to
writing probably in the eighth century C.E., the period which
Tantric Buddhism was taking hold in Tibet (Evans-Wentz 73-74).
In a forward to a more recent translation, however, Chogyam
Trungpa, Rinpoche tells us that the book was one of six in a
series of instructions for liberations composed by Padmasambhava
and committed to writing by his wife Yeshe Tsogyal.

The Bardo

Thodol, often called "The Tibetan Book of the Dead" because, like

the Egyptian Book of the Dead, it was meant to be read to the
dying to assist in the transition of death, is more accurately
known as "Liberation By Hearing on the After-Death Plane" (Evans
Wentz 2).
As implied by this title, it is hoped that the words will
help the dying to discipline their thoughts so as to eliminate
clinging or other actions in the instant of death and in the

stages of intermediate existence.

Without such clinging, rebirth

would not occur and thus liberation from samsara would be
achieved.

Should the individual not achieve such a state, the

hearing of the Bardo may at least ease the transition between
death and rebirth by informing the dying of the experiences to be
expected during the process, and by instructing the dying in the
mental disciplines to be practiced in the intermediate state
which could influence the conditions for rebirth in one of the
more favorable realms.

Pure LfWd Buddhis.w

Unlike most other forms of Buddhism which do not focus on
rebirth as a central concept, Pure Land relies heavily on the
concept of rebirth.

Coupled with the belief in savior-type

Bodhisattvas, rebirth into a "pure" land or Buddha land becomes
the object of practice.
Pure Land Buddhism, popular from the second century CE in
much of northern India and Central Asia and immensely important
even today in East and South East Asia, is geared to lay
Buddhists who haven't either the luxury or will to "master
clerical discipline and learning" (Andrews 1).

For Pure Land

practitioners, the possibility of the release from samsara and
all of its sufferings and delusions lie in the promise of a
"transmigratory rebirth into a pure land, a spiritually pure
Buddha-realm where all conditions are conducive to spiritual

progress and rapid advancement to enlightenment and Buddhhahood"
(l ) .

This belief was made poss{ble, of course, by the existence
of the Bodhisattva Vow, "All beings, without number, I vow to
liberate" (Kapleau 212).

One popular Buddha, Amitabha (known

variously as Dharmakara, Amita, Amida, Amitayus, A-mi-t'o-fo),
took the Bodhisattva Vow further than most.
Larger Pure Land Sutra were Forty Eight Vows.

Outlined in the
In three of these

vows, Dharmakara (Amitabha) specifies the practice for rebirth
into his Buddha Land; vows 18, 19, and 20:
18

If I should become a Buddha, and sentient beings
of the ten regions who have sincere faith and
desire to be born in my country, [producing]
even ten reflections, are not born there,
excepting those who have committed the five
irredeemable evils and maligned the tue Dharma,
then I will not accept perfect enlightenment.

19

If I should become a Buddha, and, when they are
about to die, do not appear surrounded by a
great host before the sentient beings of the ten
regions who have aroused the enlightened mind,
practiced various meritous works, have sincere
faith, and have aroused their aspiration
desiring to be born in my country, then I will
not accept perfect enlightenment.

20

If I should become a Buddha, and the sentient
beings of the ten regions who hear my name,
reflect on my country, store up a stock of
merit, and sincerely dedicated it desiring to be
born in my country do not achieve the result [of
their merit dedication], then I will not accept
perfect enlightenment. [Taisho shinshu daizokyo,
XII, 268a-b] (Andrews 10)
There are two ways that the practice of nembutsu is

purported to affect the status of one's rebirth.

While the

Larger Pure Land Sutra relies on the compassion of Amitabha as

the saving force with nembutsu being the means by which aspirants
demonstrate their interest in a better rebirth, the Amitabha
Contemplation Sutra holds to the belief that the practice on
nembutsu will actually annul "bad" karma.

In this sutra many of

the contemplation exercises close with such statements as "If one
perfects this contemplation he will cancel .fifty billion kalpas
of samsaric sinful deeds and will surely be reborn into the Pure
Land of Utter Bliss" [Taisho shinshu daizokyo, XII, 343b-c]
(Andrews 15).

Having had one's bad karma annulled, one would

then become worthy of rebirth into the Pure Land.
Both sutras agree however, that by which ever means, any
lowly being which had not committed one of the five irredeemable
evils

namely patricide, matricide, murder of an arhat,

injuring or killing a Buddha or disrupting the harmony of the
monastic order (Andrews 9) -- could attain rebirth by the
practice of nembutsu (Andrews 20).
Interestingly, one Chinese sect of Pure Land founded by
T'an-Iuan, the Sui-T'ang School, taught that even those who had
committed an irredeemable sin could, with practice of the "Ten
Reflections" be reborn into a buddha land (Andrews 23).

From the

T'an-luan Commentary:
Although those of the lowest grades [of rebirth] cannot
comprehend that dharmata (true reality) is unproduced,
simply by the power derived from reciting the Buddha's
name they produce the resolve to be reborn and aspire
to be reborn in that land. [Taisho shinshu daizokyo
1819.40.839b4-6] (Tanaka 70)
In Japan, the T'ien-t'ai, or Tendai school lent much to the
development of Pure Land doctrines.

During Genshin's time, there existed a debate as to the
ontological status of the pure lands and the beings which were
able to inhabit them.

Some schools held that buddha lands were

recompense lands, reward-lands in which only buddhas and
bodhisattvas could be born.

Genshin dismissed this and other

positions on the ontological status of the pure lands as being
full of artificial distinctions, and maintained in his Ojoyushu
that by means of "extreme nembutsu" most anyone can attain
rebirth in Sukhavati, or a Pure Land (Andrews 94-95).

To back

this claim, Genshin referred to a passage in the authoritative
Tendai text Commentary on the Vimalakirti Sutra set down by Chih
i:

Question:
. how can those with heavy karma be
reborn into a pure land?
Answer: Master T'ien-T'ai [Chih-i] states:
'Although the Land of the Buddha of Eternal Life has
superior benefits, if at the time of death [a being
with heavy karma] repents and reflects on the Buddha,
his karmic obstacles will topple and he will gain
rebirth.
. .'[399 Ojoyushu] (Andrews 95)
It is important to note the alternatives Pure Land followers
have to being reborn into a Buddha Land.

Buddhist thought as a

whole holds that there are six possible realms into which
sentient beings can be reborn.

These are I. The Realm of Hells;

II. The Realm of Hungry Spirits or Ghosts (Pretas); III. The
Realm of Beasts, IV; The Realm of Angry Demons; V. The Realm of
Human Beings; and, VI. The Realm of Heavenly Beings (Devas).
Emphasis is given through-out Buddhism on how difficult it is to
be born in the Human Realm, and how the tremendous opportunities
for advancement available to humans are not to be wasted.

If in this world we do not try to discipline ourselves
neither will we be any better in a future world.
It is
difficult to be born as a human being in the endless
cycle of birth and death.
Even though we do obtain
birth as a human being it is difficult to obtain the
various faculties.
And even though we may have the
various faculties the chances are few that one will
have an opportunity to get acquainted with Buddhism.
And even though one gets acquainted with Buddhism it is
difficult to obtain a heart of faith.
. .(Genshin's
60)
And in the Hokkekyo we read:
during the endless and numberless Kalpas it ~s
difficult to have an opportunity to hear this Law. And
even though this Law is heard it is difficult to become
a human and become acquainted with Buddhism.
• Now,
therefore, in this our present life is our one chane to
depart from this sea of suffering and to obtain birth
in Paradise. (Genshin's 60)
Genshin, in his Ojoyoshu goes to great lengths to study in
gruesome detail the six realms, with particular efforts taken to
explore the grisly horrors of the eight Hells.

His purpose here

was to instill an aversion to the six "Defiled Realms" of
sentient existence in general as well as a deep fear of rebirth
into one of the Hells.

This aversion and fear would, it was

hoped, motivate people to aspire to be reborn into a Buddha Land,
or more specifically in Genshin's case, Amitabha Buddha's Pure
Land, so as to be free of the dangers and torments of the six
"defiled Realms"

(Andrews 45).

Conclusion

The debate over rebirth has not died down among Buddhist, as
evidenced by the volume of publications put out in recent years
regarding this subject.

While beyond the scope of this paper to

survey the contemporary works, pointing to the existence of this
literature serves to convey the complexity of the rebirth
problems in light of the fact that Buddhism is twenty five
centuries old.
A general tendency can be

se~n

in the level of importance

given to the rebirth debates, at least among the philosophical
schools, as Buddhism has moved throughout the world.

In India,

possibly as a result of Hindu belief structures, the mechanics of
rebirth were debated hotly.

As related earlier, a number of

resultant issues came forth.

These included: the problem of

rebirth without transmigration of a Soul or Self; the quarrel
over the existence of an intermediate state of being; and the
possibility of karmic responsibility and retribution in death,
rebirth and subsequent lives,
In China, where there was no prior established idea of
rebirth, though belief in retribution of a sort was already
established by the indigenous philosophical systems, the
philosophical problems of rebirth were virtually overlooked while
the theory of retribution was largely capitalized upon, most
prominently in the Pure Land Schools.
Japan, two major schools of Buddhist thought dominated the
scene.

As in China, Pure Land and its various offshoots in Japan

enjoyed great prominence.

The other major tradition, Zen, like

its Chinese equivalent, Ch'an, mostly ignored rebirth to devote
energies to the problems arising "in this very instant", in hopes
that enlightenment could be attained before one could experience
rebirth again.

This concludes a very brief overview of the issues
surrounding the Buddhist doctrine of rebirth which have been
addressed in Asia before modern times.
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